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Karl Brunner (1961) argues that movements
in a monetary policy measure should solely reflect
those actions undertaken through all three of the
Federal Reserve’s policy tools: open market op-
erations, discount window loans, and changes in
reserve requirements. In Brunner’s view, high-
powered money—the sum of bank reserves and
currency held by the nonbank public (also known
as source base)—is too narrow a measure for
policy analysis. His main criticism is that changes
in reserve requirement ratios would not cause
movements in high-powered money. As a result,
he suggests constructing an adjustment factor—
which he terms liberated reserves—to measure
policy actions undertaken via changes in reserve
requirements. Brunner defines the monetary base
as the sum of high-powered money and the
adjustment factor. This combination provides a
monetary policy measure that possesses Brunner’s
desired property of representing all Federal Re-
serve tools.1
Following Brunner’s lead, both the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis (hereafter “St. Louis”)
and the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (hereafter “Board”) currently cal-
culate monetary base series that add an adjust-
ment factor to high-powered money. The purpose
of the adjustment factor ostensibly is to measure,
in dollar terms, monetary policy actions im-
plemented through changes in reserve require-
ments. In both the St. Louis and Board measures,
the adjustment factor is an index value con-
structed as the difference between what required
reserves would have been under the base-period
reserve requirement structure and actual re-
quired reserves. Movements in the index value,
therefore, are interpreted as changes in the
amount of required reserves freed (absorbed)
relative to the base period.
Peter Frost (1977) and Manfred Neumann
(1983), however, have argued that the St. Louis
index value is a poor proxy for measuring changes
in reserve requirements.2 In essence, these critics
argue that movements in the adjustment factor,
over time, can occur for nonpolicy reasons. Critics
claim, as such, that the adjustment factor is not a
pure measure of policy changes conducted through
the Federal Reserve’s tools but includes other
considerations.
This measurement issue is potentially im-
portant for students of monetary policy. If move-
ments in the adjustment factor are an amalgam of
policy and nonpolicy actions, it is a mistake to
interpret movements in the St. Louis adjustment
factor as a direct measure of reserve requirement
ratio changes. To illustrate this point, suppose
that a nonpolicy action causes a movement in the
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adjustment factor. A researcher looking at such an
episode in monetary policy history would, using
the adjustment factor, erroneously identify this
movement as reflective of a policy action. This
identification problem also arises when research-
ers estimate correlations between the adjustment
factor and economic variables, claiming the ad-
justment factor measures reserve requirement
ratio changes. If the adjustment factor does not
properly distinguish between policy and nonpolicy
actions, it is not clear whether either episodic
differences or the estimated correlations are due
to movements in policy actions, nonpolicy ac-
tions, or both. Examples of potential inference
problems arise in several articles examining the
relationship between reserve requirements and
economic activity, including Prakesh Lougani
and Mark Rush (forthcoming), Joseph Haslag
and Scott Hein (1992), Charles Plosser (1990),
and Mark Toma (1988).
We have two main objectives in this article.
First, we describe and construct a measure of
changes in required reserves caused by changes
in reserve requirement ratios for the United States
from 1929 through 1993. Unlike the current re-
serve adjustment measures, this alternative mea-
sure distinguishes between movements resulting
from changes in reserve requirement ratios and
those resulting from changes in deposits. Our
alternative measure is constructed by modifying
Brunner’s liberated reserves notion. More specifi-
cally, we constrain changes in the reserve index
measure to equal zero during periods in which no
changes in reserve requirement structures were
implemented. Our objective is to generate a
cleaner measure of changes in reserve require-
ments, especially for analysts explicitly interested
in monetary policy research.
The second, and more important, objective
is to empirically assess the importance of this
measurement issue. While the criticism of the
existing procedure has been around since the late
1970s, the significance of the distortion has been
generally ignored. After providing a descriptive
(episodic) overview of the measurement differ-
ences, we use formal statistical techniques to
quantify the differences between the existing
adjustment factor and our measure.
The history of adjustment factors
Before we describe the alternative method
used to construct the reserve requirement change,
it is useful to provide a brief overview of the
adjustment factor. With such an overview, one
can better understand how the definition of
adjustment factor has evolved over time and the
criticisms of this measure.
Brunner (1961) first suggested the idea of
a comprehensive measure of monetary policy
actions. He proposed the notion of liberated
reserves, defined as reserves freed or impounded
by changes in reserve requirements. Leonall
Anderson and Jerry Jordan (1968, 8) describe the
process of constructing the reserve adjustment
measure for a particular month as follows:
First, the weighted average reserve
requirement on demand deposits for the
month (using for weights the distribution of
these deposits by class of member bank) is
computed. Then, the difference in average
reserve requirements from the previous
month is multiplied by net demand deposits
for the previous month.
The reserve adjustment measure is then the
algebraic sum of the monthly estimations. Thus,
the change in the reserve adjustment measure is
simply
(1) ∆L = Dt∆wr,
where  L denotes liberated reserves, Dt is the
period-t level of deposits against which reserves
are required to be held, and ∆wr = wrt – wrt–1 is
the change in the weighted average of reserve
requirement ratios. 3 (The ∆ is the first-difference
operator.) The weighted average takes into ac-
count that reserve requirements are different for
different-sized banks. For example, in 1994 the
first $51.9 million of checkable deposits at a
particular bank are subject to a 3-percent reserve
requirement. (This $51.9 million level is called the
low-reserve tranche.) For deposit levels above the
low-reserve tranche, the reserve requirement
ratio is 10 percent. The weighted average is then
the sum of the following products: the fraction of
period-t deposits that are subject to the low-
tranche reserve requirement times 0.03 (the 3-
percent reserve requirement) and the fraction of
period-t deposit levels that are above the low-
reserve tranche level times 0.10 (the 10-percent
reserve requirement). Note that if there were only
one reserve requirement ratio, this approach
would yield changes in liberated reserves only
when reserve requirements were changed.
A problem with constructing liberated re-
serves in this way is that nonpolicy actions can
affect the change in liberated reserves over time.
For example, suppose that depositors shift their
accounts from banks with deposit levels below
the low-reserve tranche to large banks. Because
the reserve requirement ratio is higher at the large4
bank than at the small bank, the weighted average
reserve requirement ratio will change. Conse-
quently, there is a change in the reserve adjust-
ment measure. Frost (1977) identifies this problem,
as well as another concern, in measuring mon-
etary policy using the monetary base measure.
(See the box entitled “Frost’s Logarithmic Adjust-
ment Factor” for details on his methodology.)
At about the same time as Frost’s work, two
researchers at the St. Louis Fed, Albert Burger and
Robert Rasche (1977), were calculating the Re-
serve Adjustment Magnitude, or RAM. St. Louis’
RAM was designed to measure the impact of
changes in reserve requirement ratios. The Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ adjustment mea-
sure is calculated as
(2) RAMt = (rb – rt)Dt,
where rt is the vector of the reserve requirement
ratios that apply in period t, rb is the vector of the
reserve requirement ratios in a selected base
period, and Dt is the vector of period-t quantity
of deposits against which reserves must be held.
The St. Louis monetary base adds RAM to high-
powered money. RAM can be interpreted as the
level of required reserves in period t less what
required reserves would have been were the
base-period reserve requirement still in effect. A
positive value of RAM indicates that reserves have
been freed relative to the base-period reserve
requirements. Conversely, a negative value indi-
cates that reserves have been impounded relative
to the base-period reserve requirements.
Consider how RAM changes over time. The
changes in RAM from one period to the next
(discrete time) can be represented as
(3) ∆RAMt = –∆rtDt + (rb – rt)∆Dt.
Equation 3 indicates that RAM changes over time
in response to two factors. The first term on the
right-hand side of equation 3 captures changes in
reserve requirement ratios. The second term,
which we refer to as the deposit-flow effect,
indicates that RAM can change over time even if
reserve requirements are constant.4 Specifically,
changes in deposits indirectly reflect both the
households’ and banks’ behavior. Because these
changes affect both RAM and the monetary base,
the adjustment factor presents a basic identifica-
tion problem: movements in RAM can be due to
changes in reserve requirements, due to changes
in deposits against which reserves must be held,
or some combination of both. The implication is
that RAM is a potentially poor proxy of changes
in reserve requirement ratios.5
In the remainder of this article, we turn our
attention to measuring changes in required re-
serve ratios. We construct our measurement by
constraining the change in measure of required
reserves to equal zero for those periods in which
no change is made in reserve requirements.
Constructing the reserve step index
We offer an alternative measure of effective
reserve requirement ratios that is not affected by
such deposit flows. To create our measure, which
we term the reserve step index (RSI), we use data
on weekly levels of required reserves. We modify
the St. Louis base-period selection process; that is,
our RSI measure is constructed using the reserve
requirement ratio structure for August 1978. St.
Louis, however, uses the average reserve require-
ment structure for 1976–80 as its base period.6
We choose August 1978 for our RSI base period
for two reasons. First, August 1978 is the month in
which RAM is closest to zero (there are no
monthly values of RAM in which it is identically
zero). Second, our base-period selection permits
a fairly direct comparison with the St. Louis RAM
measure insofar as the average reserve require-
ment ratio in 1976–80 is evidently close to the
August 1978 reserve requirement structure.
The various dates for changes in reserve
requirement ratios are obtained from the annual
report of the Board of Governors for every year
from 1929 to the present.7 With the dates of the
changes in reserve requirement ratios, the differ-
ence between required reserves in the week(s) in
which the change in structure took place and the
week prior to change is used as our estimate of the
value of reserves freed (absorbed) by the policy
action.8 This measure is added to the previous
level of RSI, resulting in a cumulative measure of
dollar changes in required reserves resulting from
changes in reserve requirement ratios.
We consider separately the dates after
August 1978 and the dates before August 1978.
For dates after August 1978, we look for the first
period that reserve requirement ratios were
altered. For each date after August 1978, we
calculate the change in RSI as
RRt–1 – RRt if reserve
requirement changes,
(4) RSIt – RSIt–1 =o r
0, otherwise.
Similarly, from the August 1978 benchmark, we
move backward in time, looking sequentially for
dates on which changes in the reserve require-
ment ratio structure were implemented. Again,
equation 4 is used to determine the path of RSI.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 5 ECONOMIC REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 1995
In periods in which there is no change in reserve
requirements, equation 4 dictates that the step
index be held constant.
When the change in RSI is not zero, equa-
tion 4 indicates the change in the dollar amount
of reserves freed (absorbed) by changes in re-
serve requirements in the particular week in
which the reserve requirement change was en-
acted. While the input data we use is weekly, our
aim is to construct a monthly series. We simply
sum across all the weekly changes in RSI that take
place within a month to get a monthly value. With
the estimates of monthly changes, we start with
RSI = 0 in August 1978, adding the monthly value
of the change in RSI  to the previous month’s
level, both forward and backward in time, to
create our time series. The result is an index time
series documenting the cumulative measure of
changes in required reserves, relative to August
1978, that are due to changes in reserve require-
ment ratios.
The relationship between changes in RSI
and changes in RAM is straightforward. First, note
that RRt = rtDt (where RR is required reserves).
For periods in which changes in reserve require-
ment ratios occur, substituting this expression
into equation 3, one can write
(5) ∆RAMt = rb’∆Dt + ∆RSIt for rt ≠ rt–1,
where ∆ is the difference operator. In periods in
which no changes in reserve requirements take
place, rt = rt –1,
(6) ∆RAMt = rb’∆Dt – rt’∆Dt = (rb – rt)∆Dt, and
∆RSIt = 0.
Peter Frost (1977) identifies a problem with
a monetary base measure. Specifically, Frost
argues that the measure “distorts the effect of
Federal Reserve policy actions on the growth in the
money supply” (1977, 168). Frost’s point is that
the growth rate of the monetary base should be
equal to the growth rate of high-powered money
in periods in which reserve requirements are con-
stant. Yet, Frost shows that differentiating the log
of liberated reserves with respect to time yields
(A.1)
Frost proposes a solution to this problem: a
logarithmic adjustment factor. The bottom line is
that Frost’s series ensures that the monetary base
and high-powered money grow at identical rates in
those periods in which reserve requirement ratios
do not change. However, in levels, the logarithmic
adjustment factor moves over time, even in those
periods in which reserve requirements do not
change. As such, Frost’s measure is suspect as a
measure of monetary policy actions implemented
through changes in reserve requirement ratios.
Frost’s adjustment factor is defined as
(A.2)
where Gr is the arithmetic mean of 1/(r + k) for
period t and period t–1, r is the reserve-to-deposit
ratio, k is the currency-to-deposit ratio, and ∆r is
the change in reserve requirements. Obviously,
with ∆r = 0 (a case in which reserve requirements
are constant over time), Γ is constant. The logarith-
mic reserve adjustment measure uses Γ so that
the percentage change in the logarithmic reserve
adjustment is equal to the change in high-powered
Frost’s Logarithmic Adjustment Factor
money. Formally,
(A.3) ln(B + L*)t = lnBt + Γt.
Differentiate equation A.3 with respect to time and
solve for the growth rate of the logarithmic adjust-
ment factor (L*) to yield
(A.4)
From equation A.2, the term dΓ/dt = 0 during
periods in which reserve requirements do not
change. Thus, the percentage change in L* is equal
to the percentage change in B, implying that B and
B + L* grow at the same rate.
For our purposes, equation A.4 indicates
that the value of L* does change over time, even
when reserve requirements do not. So, Frost’s
approach satisfies the criterion that growth rates for
high-powered money and monetary base are
identical in those periods in which reserve require-
ments do not change. However, L* is not a good
indicator of changes in reserve requirements, in our
sense, because it moves over time even though
reserve requirements do not change.
It is important to note that Frost’s Γ term is
quite similar to our notion of what makes a good
measure. Both RSI and Γ do not change during
periods in which reserve requirement ratios are
constant. In constructing RSI, we use the level of
required reserves as the basis for calculating
changes in required reserves caused by changes
in reserve requirement ratios. Implicitly, we are
multiplying changes in reserve requirement ratios
by deposits. However, Frost calculates Γ as the
product of the change in reserve requirement ratios
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Taken together, equations 5 and 6 describe the
movements in RAM, differentiating between peri-
ods in which changes in reserve requirement
ratios occur and periods in which only changes
in deposit levels occur. Equations 5 and 6 share
a common term, rb’∆Dt. This term represents
the change in required reserves due to deposit
flows (∆Dt).
The deposit-flow effect, (rb – rt)’∆Dt, makes
it difficult to use the St. Louis measure as proxy for
measuring changes in reserve requirement ratios.
Using the RAM methodology, required reserves
are treated as freed (or absorbed) as deposits
change over time, even when reserve require-
ment ratios are fixed and rb ≠ rt. In contrast, for
periods in which no changes to reserve require-
ments occur, ∆RSI = 0 by construction.9 Our next
objective is to empirically assess the costs, if any,
of including the deposit-flow variable in a meas-
ure of changes in reserve requirement ratios.
Comparing RSI and RAM over time
Figure 1 plots the original RAM series and
RSI, the step index, from January 1929 through
December 1993. (The actual monthly series for
RSI is included in the appendix.) By construction,
RSI does not move in periods between changes in
reserve requirement structures. As such, the re-
serve step index is constructed as a sequence of
infrequent, permanent shocks. This time series
behavior is quite different from that of RAM,
which shows much more drift; that is, RAM ex-
periences more frequent changes in its level.
Because both series are index numbers, a
comparison of the two series is implicitly a
comparison relative to the base period. Because
we use essentially the same base period to
construct RSI as RAM, however, absolute com-
parisons of the two series, and the implied reserve
requirement ratio structures, are a justifiable ap-
proximation.
The two reserve index series (RAM and RSI)
exhibit qualitatively similar time series behavior.
Some important differences, however, emerge
during particular episodes. For example, con-
sider the period 1929–36. This period repre-
sents an interval in which there is a sizable
difference between the levels of the two meas-
ures. RSI hovers around –$4 billion for most of
this period, indicating that reserve requirements
were higher during this interval than those in
place during the 1978 base period. In contrast, in
the 1929–36 period, RAM is near zero for the
entire period. A researcher using RAM (and inter-
preting it as changes in reserve requirement
ratios) would infer that reserve requirements in
the 1929 through 1936 period were really not that
different from those of the 1976–80 period. The
interpretation provided by RAM is that reserve
requirements were not very restrictive during
the first half of the 1930s relative to the August
1978 base period. RSI, however, suggests a much
more restrictive policy stance was in place in
the 1929–36 period relative to the August 1978
base period. Specifically, the 1929–36 reserve
requirement structure absorbed about $4 billion
Figure 1
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in reserves relative to the August 1978 reserve
requirement structure. After 1936, both RSI and
RAM decline, and by 1945, the two series obtain
about the same level. In highlighting the 1929–36
period, it is easy to see inference problems
created by the presence of the deposit-flow effect
during the Great Depression. The fact that RAM
is close to zero during the 1929–36 period has
more to do with the outflow of deposits from
banks during this period than with monetary
policy actions. As such, one could wrongly infer
that reserve requirements were about the same
in the 1929–36 period as they were during the
1976–80 period.10
Another discrepancy between the time
series behavior of RAM and RSI occurs beginning
in 1973 and ending about 1975. In early 1973, RSI
falls slightly, while RAM begins a steady decline
that ends in early 1975. Both RAM and RSI are
below zero, indicating that the reserve require-
ment structure during the 1973–75 period was
high relative to the appropriate base periods.
Deposit inflows, with basically high reserve re-
quirements relative to the base period, drive RAM
down sharply from 1973 through 1975. RSI,
however, indicates that very few required re-
serves were absorbed by reserve requirement
ratio changes during this period. As measured
by RAM, the rapid deposit growth in this period
would have exaggerated the policy constrain-
ing effects of reserve requirements. As the public
moved deposits into reservable deposit accounts
in 1973, RAM suggests that the level of required
reserves was becoming more and more restric-
tive during the 1973–75 period. RSI suggests,
however, that the average level of required
reserves was raised only slightly between 1973
and 1975.11
Similarly, again in 1987–90, deposit out-
flows drive RAM sharply lower than RSI. Between
1987 and 1990, RAM increases only slightly. One
could infer that reserve requirement ratios had
been lowered slightly, freeing a small amount of
reserves. In contrast, RSI rises rather sharply
during the 1987–90 period, indicating that mone-
tary policy was actually freeing a larger amount of
reserves.12 Based on RAM, the late 1980s looks
like a period in which reserve requirements were
lowered slightly, then held fairly steady. In con-
trast, RSI indicates that a series of policy actions
was implemented in which reserve require-
ments were lowered. The data in Figure 1 can be
reconciled by treating the small increase in
RAM as resulting from deposit outflows. Reserves
freed by lower reserve requirements were being
offset by smaller quantities of deposits. Conse-
quently, RAM—the product of these two sepa-
rate effects—shows only slight increases, while
RSI accurately captures the falling reserve re-
quirements.
A time series analysis of the differences
between RSI and RAM
By displaying the levels of the RAM and the
RSI series, Figure 1 depicts episodic differences
between the two measures. However, the evi-
dence does little to shed light on the importance
of such differences. It may be the case that the
two series only randomly deviate from (a linear
combination of) one another. One way to shed
light on this issue is to examine the statistical
long-run relationships between RSI and RAM. In
particular, we ask whether RAM and RSI are
similar time series. Our belief is that there is no
permanent long-run association between these
two measures in the sense that if one wanted
to forecast movements in RSI using RAM over
an infinite horizon, the variance around that
forecast would be infinity. Based on the time
series behavior presented in Figure 1, we sus-
pect that deposit-flow effects can, and do, cause
the two variables to permanently diverge from
one another.
Robert Engle and Clive Granger (1987) have
suggested the use of cointegration techniques
to explore long-run relationships in time series.
If deposit-flow effects are a short-run phenome-
non that results only in temporary deviations
between the two measures, then deviations be-
tween the two series should disappear in the long
run. Hence, such deviations can be character-
ized as simply “noise.” On the other hand, if
deposit flows are significant and not self-revers-
ing, there is likely to be no long-run relationship
in the two series.
Evidence indicates that both RAM and RSI
are integrated of order one—I(1).13 As such, the
two series may be cointegrated. The following
is the output from an ordinary least squares
regression using levels of RAM and RSI (standard
errors in parentheses):
(7) RAMt = –.323 + .862 RSIt + et.
(.125) (.17)
D–W = .03; R2 = .82.
As the two measures, RSI and RAM, each has
unit roots, a test for cointegration seeks to deter-
mine whether there is a unit root in the residual,
et, from equation 7. Under the null hypothesis
that there is a unit root in et, the test statistic is
–2.25, which is larger than the 5-percent critical
value of –3.17. Hence, one fails to reject the null
hypothesis that there is a unit root in the error8
term. Thus, one cannot reject the null hypothesis
that RAM and RSI are not cointegrated.14 Simi-
larly, the small value of the Durbin–Watson
statistic also suggests that RAM and RSI are not
cointegrated. The evidence, therefore, suggests
there is no long-run relationship between RAM
and RSI. As such, there is no evidence to support
the notion that RSI and RAM are driven by a
common factor. Nor should one conclude that
deviations in the two measures simply reflect self-
reversing noise.
Our interpretation of these tests is that RAM
gives weight to a deposit-flow effect that may
permanently bias the estimate of changes in
required reserves resulting from true changes in
reserve requirement ratios over an infinite hori-
zon. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the
deposit-flow effect is itself integrated of order
one; that is, the deposits against which reserves
must be held have a unit root, resulting in RAM
and  RSI not being cointegrated. Indeed, an
auxiliary test is to look for unit roots in the
differences in the time series—RAMt –  RSIt—
which, by construction, is the deposit-flow effect,
measured as the vector product of deposits against
which reserves must be held times the difference
in reserve requirements in the current period and
in the base period. Unit root tests on this variable
indicate that this deposit-flow measure is indeed
integrated of order one—I(1). In light of these
findings, the discrepancy in the two alternative
measures of changes in required reserves is not a
trivial issue. The differences between the two
series do not gravitate toward zero in the long
run. The evidence presented formalizes what
“ocular econometrics” suggests—the two series
are different. This evidence further suggests that
the two measures would provide very different
signals about changes in reserve requirement
ratios over time.
Relationships to economic activity
In this section, we examine two specific
questions in a reduced-form macroeconomic set-
ting. First, does the deposit-flow measure help to
predict movements in macroeconomic variables
differently from the current reserve requirement
measure?15 Since RSI ignores the deposit-flow
effect, testing for marginal predictive power of
deposit-flow effects is an indirect test of what
measure is contributing to the predictive power of
RAM. Second, are the coefficients on deposit-
flow measure equal to the coefficients on RSI?
Because RAM essentially constrains these two
effects to be equal, empirical work using RAM
supposes that the effects of changes in reserve
requirements and changes in deposits are identi-
cal. The question, however, is whether this con-
straint is empirically supported.
To examine the first question, we begin by
separating the deposit-flow effect and the reserve-
requirement effect. We define ∆DEPFLOWt  =
∆RAMt – ∆RSIt. ∆DEPFLOW generally will not
equal zero for periods in which changes in
reserve requirement ratios occur.16
The strategy here is to estimate reduced-
form macroeconomic models in which the ex-
planatory variable, the percentage change in
RAM, is decomposed into the percentage change
in the deposit-flow variable and the percentage
change in RSI (each as a proportion of the
adjusted monetary base).17 The reduced-form
setting is useful for purposes of identifying differ-
ences in predictive content. In these simple
regressions, we are focusing on the indicator
properties of the separate components of the
monetary base. (Of course, this question does not
answer whether the monetary base is a better or
worse indicator compared with other variables.)
We estimate separately reduced-form
models of the inflation rate (using the implicit
price deflator), the percentage change in real
GNP, and the percentage change in nominal GNP.
The right-hand-side variables in these regressions
are lagged values of the percentage change in
high-powered money (∆SB), ∆RSI, and the de-
posit-flow variable (∆DEPFLOW ). In the infla-
tion and output growth equations, we include
both lagged values of the inflation rate and real
GNP growth. In the nominal GNP growth equa-
tion, lagged values of nominal GNP growth are
also included. We use the Akaike Information Cri-
terion to select the appropriate lag length for all
explanatory variables in the regressions. The
general representation of the reduced-form re-
gressions is as follows:
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where  ∆Y is nominal GNP growth, ∆P is the
inflation rate, and ∆y is output growth. The ni’s
denote the appropriate lag length for each vari-
able in the model.
Unfortunately, national income and prod-
uct accounts data are not constructed in a consis-
tent manner back to 1929. Hence, we use two
different data sources. For the period 1929–83,
we use quarterly data from Nathan Balke and
Robert Gordon (1986) on real GNP and the fixed-
weight deflator. Since these data end in 1983,
we also consider a postwar period that includes
more recent history, namely, 1951–93. For this
period, we use real GNP, the implicit price
deflator, and nominal GNP data from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis. In all, we estimate the
three reduced-form regressions over two periods:
1929–83 and 1951–93.
The key reason for separating the reserve-
requirement effect and the deposit-flow effect in
a reduced-form specification is that the deposit-
flow effect signals changes affecting both the
demand for deposits by households and busi-
nesses and the supply of deposits by banks. As
such, the deposit-flow effect in this reduced-form
equation is not a pure policy measure but is an
amalgam of these different shocks.18
The reduced-form setting used in this analy-
sis does little to shed light on the transmission
mechanism differentiating the reserve-require-
ment effect from the deposit-flow effect because
we do not have structural equations. However,
the reserve-requirement effect represents a tax on
the banking system and, hence, is a particular
type of shock. Thus, while these tests do not
provide direct evidence on the structural effects,
they do provide evidence on whether separating
reserve-requirement effects from other effects
helps to predict economic activity. Moreover, the
∆RAM measure implicitly assumes that the
effects of changes in ∆DEPFLOW and ∆RSI are
equal. By separately including the deposit-flow
measure and ∆RSI in the regression, we can test
whether this restriction is supported by the data.
This test is important in analyzing the response
of macroeconomic variables to policy changes,
as given in impulse response functions. Specifi-
cally, if the coefficients on lagged values of ∆RSI
are different from the coefficients on lagged
values of the deposit-flow measure, one cost
of using ∆RAM is that impulse response func-
tions—or, for that matter, any parameter esti-
mate—will be biased.
Table 1 reports the sum of the estimated
coefficients for each of the three regression
equations, using data for the period 1929–83.19
The table also summarizes evidence on the null
hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients equals
zero. Insofar as the sum of the coefficients in-
dicates some long-run relationship present in
the reduced-form equation, the test determines
whether there are significant long-run predic-
tive effects.20 Table 1 documents that ∆RSI is
significantly related to changes in inflation, out-
put growth, and nominal GNP growth in the
sense that the sum of coefficients is different
from zero. Increases in ∆RSI, occurring because
of a lowering of reserve requirements, pre-
dict subsequent increases in inflation, output
growth, and nominal GNP growth. In contrast,
∆DEPFLOW is not related to the inflation rate
or nominal GNP growth. Moreover, while
∆DEPFLOW is weakly related (at the 10-percent
significance level) to output growth, as indicated
by the tests on the sum of the coefficients,
increases in deposit flows predict subsequent
decreases in output growth.21
Table 2 reports the sum of the coefficients
and test statistics, estimating the same relation-
ships with data after World War II: 1951–93.22
Table 1
Regression Results for Inflation, Output Growth,
And Nominal GNP Growth Equations, 1929–83
Sum of the Estimated Coefficients
Dependent Variable
Independent Variable Inflation Real GNP Nominal GNP
Inflation .720(1)** .005(1) NA
Output growth –.051(2) .515(3) NA
∆SB .091(6) .005(3) .172(6)
∆RSI .176(7)** .560(2)** .568(7)**
∆DEPFLOW .062(1) –.409(1)* .160(2)
Nominal GNP growth NA NA .627(4)**
Table 2
Regression Results for Inflation, Output Growth,
And Nominal GNP Growth Equations, 1951–93
Sum of the Estimated Coefficients
Dependent Variable
Independent Variable Inflation Real GNP Nominal GNP
Inflation .867(3)** –.135(1) NA
Output growth .064(1) .310(1) NA
∆SB –.001(1) .007(1) .005(1)
∆RSI .008(7) –.010(7) –.030(7)
∆DEPFLOW –.037(7) .002(1) –.006(1)
Nominal GNP growth NA NA .366(1)
*Significant at the 10-percent level.
**Significant at the 5-percent level.
NA denotes not applicable.
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses represent the number of lagged values included in the regression.10
The results differ from the 1929–83 period in two
particular ways. First, the sum of the coefficients
on ∆RSI and ∆DEPFLOW is uniformly smaller in
the 1951–93 sample than in the 1929–83 sample.
Second, neither ∆RSI nor ∆DEPFLOW exhibits a
statistically significant long-run relationship to
economic activity in the 1951–93 sample.
Another way to distinguish between re-
serve-requirement effects and deposit-flow
effects is to determine whether they differ in terms
of their short-run predictive content. Specifically,
the question is whether movements in one or
both of the components of RAM help to predict
changes in economic activity. The test statistic,
sometimes referred to as a Granger causality test,
is calculated under the null hypothesis that the
coefficients on lagged values of the variable are
jointly equal to zero. The test indicates whether
reserve requirements or deposit flow, or both, can
help predict short-run changes in economic
activity. Table 3 reports the test statistics for both
our samples. In Panel A, the tests are reported
using the 1929–83 sample, whereas Panel B
reports the tests calculated using the 1951–93
sample. In both sample periods, the results indi-
cate that ∆RSI always helps to predict changes in
inflation, output growth, and nominal GNP growth.
The ability of changes in ∆DEPFLOW to predict
changes in economic activity is uneven across the
two samples. Changes in ∆DEPFLOW help to
predict nominal GNP growth and are marginally
related to output growth in the 1929–83 sample,
but they are not significantly related to inflation.
In the 1951–93 sample, changes in ∆DEPFLOW
are significantly related to changes in inflation but
are statistically unrelated to movements in output
growth and nominal GNP growth. Thus, the
evidence suggests that either both reserve-
requirement effects and deposit-flow effects con-
tribute to a relationship between RAM and eco-
nomic activity, or only reserve-requirement effects
contribute to RAM’s predictive content. These
results suggest differences between reserve-
requirement effects and deposit-flow effects, but
the evidence relates to predictive content and
does not bear on whether the two effects should
be separated. Presumably, one would want to
distinguish between the two effects if combining
the two into one measure throws out useful
information.
The next step is to directly test the hypoth-
esis that changes in required reserves resulting
from changes in reserve requirement ratios (as
measured by ∆RSI ) have the same regression
coefficients as those of the changes resulting from
deposit flows. These results bear on the issue of
whether there is a need to separate the reserve-
requirement and deposit-flow effects. One interpre-
tation is that these coefficients describe the
short-run dynamics when shocks hit the system.
In vector autoregressions (VARs), these parame-
ter estimates are used to generate impulse re-
sponse functions. Thus, coefficient equality tests
examine whether the short-run dynamic effects of
changes in reserve requirement ratios should be
constrained to equal the effects of changes in the
deposit-flow variable.
Table 4 reports F-statistics from two differ-
ent tests. In the joint hypothesis tests, the test
statistic is calculated under the null hypothesis
Table 3
Tests of Exclusion Restrictions
Panel A: Sample Period 1929–83
Dependent Variable
Independent Variable Inflation Real GNP Nominal GNP
∆RSI 3.54** 6.96** 4.86**
∆DEPFLOW .62 2.76* 3.06**
Panel B: Sample Period 1951–93
∆RSI 4.26** 2.29** 2.63**
∆DEPFLOW 6.84** .49 .66
*Significant at the 10-percent level.
**Significant at the 5-percent level.
NOTE: F-statistics calculated under the null hypothesis that coefficients on lagged values of independent variable equal zero.
Tests are conducted on the same regressions that are reported in Table 1 and Table 2.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 11 ECONOMIC REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 1995
reserve requirements are not changing. The basic
problem is that present approaches to quantifying
these policy effects are influenced by deposit-
flow shifts. In particular, decisions under the
purview of the public or the banking community
result in shifts among deposits with different
reserve requirements that will result in changes in
the current Federal Reserve System measures.
Over time, the accumulation or decumulation of
deposits changes the measures even though re-
serve requirements are unchanged.
Why has this problem with the current
measures been ignored? One can surmise that the
economics profession either does not believe the
criticism is valid or, alternatively, believes the
measurement error is trivial.
The purpose of this article is to challenge
this conventional wisdom. To develop our case,
we first construct our own reserve requirement
step index (RSI), thus providing an alternative to
the measures constructed by the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis and the Board of Governors. Our
reserve requirement step index excludes, by
construction, the most significant movements that
result from deposit-flow occurrences. For pur-
poses of comparison, we construct our index for
the period 1929–93.
We compare our measure with the conven-
tional measure used by the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis. There are several distinct historical
episodes in which significant differences between
RSI and the St. Louis measure exist. The evidence
suggests that significant deposit flows have had
rather large impacts on the conventional meas-
ures over time. Moreover, we document that such
measurement distortions are not temporary but
are, indeed, quite long lasting.
that all individual coefficients on ∆RSI and
∆DEPFLOW are equal to one another. On the
other hand, the sum of the coefficients test
determines whether the sum of the coefficients on
lagged values of ∆RSI is equal to the sum of the
coefficients on lagged values of ∆DEPFLOW. As
such, the first test examines whether significant
differences in the short-run dynamics are present,
while the second test examines whether the long-
run impacts are statistically different for the two
effects. Because the reduced-form models use
stationary time series, it is unlikely that move-
ments in ∆RSI and ∆DEPFLOW will result
in long-run changes in inflation, real GNP growth,
and nominal GNP growth, as stationarity im-
plies that each series would return to its time-
independent mean values.
In Table 4, the top half reports the tests for
the 1929–83 sample, while the bottom half re-
ports the findings obtained using the 1951–93
sample. In all six cases, the statistic for the joint
hypothesis rejects the null hypothesis, suggesting
that the coefficients on lagged values of ∆RSI
are not equal to coefficients on lagged values of
∆DEPFLOW. The short-run predictive content of
the two variables is very different. Only in the case
of output growth in the 1929–83 sample would
one reject the null hypothesis that the sum of the
coefficients is equal. Thus, the evidence for out-
put growth in these two samples rather strongly
rejects the notion the short-run dynamic path
following a shock in RSI is identical to the path
following a shock to ∆DEPFLOW. On the other
hand, the general evidence suggests that the long-
run effects generally are not significantly different
from one another.
We interpret the significant differences be-
tween the coefficients on ∆RSI and ∆DEPFLOW
as evidence against combining the reserve-
requirement effect and deposit-flow effect, as is
done in RAM. Thus, a measure of reserve-require-
ment effects is useful for looking at pure policy
effects.
Summary and conclusions
For many years now, monetary economists
have recognized the value of quantifying the
effects of reserve requirement ratio changes in
measuring the monetary base. In fact, the Federal
Reserve System currently provides such a meas-
ure to the public. Yet, the methodology used to
quantify the effects of reserve requirement ratio
changes has been criticized, dating back to at least
1977. Researchers have pointed out that current
approaches to quantifying the effects of reserve
requirement ratio changes are flawed to the
extent that these measures can change even when
Table 4
Test Statistics on the Equality of RAM and DEPFLOW Coefficients
Estimating period: 1929–83
Joint Sum of the
Equation Hypothesis1 Coefficients
Inflation 3.51** .81
Output growth 8.17** 15.73**
Nominal GNP growth 3.65** .81
Estimating period: 1951–93
Inflation 4.14** 1.10
Output growth 2.27** .36
Nominal GNP growth 2.34** 1.27
**Significant at the 5-percent level.
1 Reported is an F-statistic calculated with degrees of freedom (n, 213 – n) for the 1929–83 sample
and (n, 138 – n) for the 1951–93 sample, respectively. Here, n  is the number of restrictions placed
on the regression.12
The differences in the two measures further
result in different statistical associations between
macroeconomic variables. We find that the purer
measure of reserve-requirement effects generally
has strong statistical associations with both infla-
tion and real GNP growth. The deposit-flow
effects, which cloud the measures of reserve
requirement changes under the current method-
ologies, do not have a similar strong relationship
to these macroeconomic variables. In fact, the
evidence suggests that the statistical relationships
are quite different for the reserve-requirement
effects and the deposit-flow effects. As such, our
findings raise serious concerns about using con-
ventional measures of the monetary base, which
presume the effects of reserve requirements and
deposit flows are the same.
The secondary aim of this article is to
provide a better measure of reserve requirement
ratio changes. Our efforts in this vein should be
viewed as an approximation. One would need
individual bank data to accurately measure the
reserve-requirement effect. Based on our approxi-
mation, however, the conventional wisdom is
challenged; that is, the measurement of reserve
requirement ratio changes does not represent a
mere second-order concern. Current approaches
are not sufficient statistics for reserve requirement
ratio changes. In contrast to the general view, we
believe that it is useful to provide an accurate time
series of reserve requirement ratio changes and
that this measurement is potentially an important
issue for economists in many macroeconomic,
monetary, and financial applications.
Notes
The authors thank John Duca, Milton Friedman, Bill
Gavin, Rik Hafer, Evan Koenig, Allan Meltzer, Manfred
Neumann, Stephen Prowse, Dan Thornton, and Mark
Wynne for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
article. Any remaining errors are our own.
1 George Tolley (1957, 466) also discusses a measure of
changes in the average reserve requirement ratio. His
construction of average reserve requirements is “jointly
determined by government, banks, and the non-bank
public.” However, Tolley’s concept of an average re-
serve requirement ratio is quite different from Brunner’s.
Tolley includes currency in his definition of reserve
base. Thus, currency has a reserve requirement ratio of
1, and Tolley’s notion is more like  a money multiplier,
though he refers to it as a reserve requirement ratio.
Brunner focuses on liberated reserves exclusively
through changes in reserves that are required against
deposits, rather than both currency and deposits.
2 This criticism applies equally to the Board adjustment
factor. Because essentially the same criticisms apply,
we focus on the St. Louis measure. Moreover, Haslag
and Hein (1992, forthcoming) provide evidence
suggesting that the St. Louis measure is more closely
related to macroeconomic activity, in a statistical
sense, than the Board measure.
3 Here, we take the liberty of treating the adjustment
factor equations as if there is one kind of deposits
against which reserves must be held. In reality, there
are different types of deposits (for example, savings
and demand deposits) and bank characteristics (for
example, reserve city, nonreserve city, small) that
determine the level of a particular bank’s required
reserves. Anderson and Jordan are careful to specify
that the construction procedure for demand deposits
also applies to savings accounts. The appropriate
vector representation of D and r are omitted without
loss of insight into the problems we are identifying.
4 Neumann (1983) shows that RAM suffers from the
same problem that Frost identifies with liberated re-
serves; that is, the growth rate of the monetary base is
not equal to the growth rate of high-powered money
during those periods in which there are no changes to
reserve requirement ratios.
5 In addition, Neumann cites the dependence of meas-
uring current monetary policy on the cumulated sum of
past changes in reserve requirements. This also is an
interesting measurement problem, but our current
focus is solely on the deposit-flow issue.
6 The Board of Governors uses the current reserve
requirement ratio structure as the base period. In an
earlier article (Haslag and Hein 1990), we provide
evidence suggesting that the St. Louis approach is
more closely related to nominal GNP growth than the
Board measure. Our belief is that the St. Louis base
has a closer statistical relationship to nominal GNP
growth than the Board base because the 1976–80
base period is more representative of the average
reserve requirement ratio structure than today’s
structure. We gratefully acknowledge the help of
Dennis Mehegen at the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis for providing us with weekly data for the period
January 1968 to June 1991.
7 In going through the Board of Governors’ annual
reports, we have selected all changes in reserve
requirement structure, including definitional changes
and size changes. See Joshua Feinman (1993) for a
partial list in which the major reserve requirement
changes are identified.
8 As such, our reserve step index is still subject to
deposit-flow effects, but only to the extent that deposit
flows occur between the weeks in which reserve
requirement ratios are changed. Note that in equation
2, the RSI can be rewritten as rt–1Dt–1 – rtDt. Changes in
deposits from t–1 to t will be picked up in the RSI. To
correct for this deficiency, one would need the use of
detailed deposit data that are not generally available.
Specifically, one would need data on deposit levels by
type for each bank. This is necessary because differ-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 13 ECONOMIC REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 1995
ent reserve requirements have applied to different
deposit levels. We believe that this deposit-flow effect
is small, especially relative to the deposit-flow effects
present in current reserve adjustment indexes that
permit change in months in which no reserve require-
ment ratio changes occur.
9 It should be noted that RSI represents essentially an
average, as opposed to a marginal, concept. If one
were to divide RSI by the quantity of deposits against
which reserves must be held, the term would represent
the average reserve requirement ratio. To construct a
marginal reserve requirement series, detailed data are
necessary on the quantity of deposits held at individual
banks by each reserve requirement distinction. Such
data, however, are not available. Thus, our efforts yield
a first approximation of changes in average marginal
reserve requirement ratios.
10 Interestingly, Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz
(1963, 526) characterize the 1936 reserve requirement
hikes as significant factors in the slowdown in eco-
nomic activity that began in 1937, an interpretation that
is more consistent with the behavior of RSI than RAM.
11 Several changes in reserve requirement structure were
enacted during the 1973–75 period. In short, reserve
requirements on demand deposits were raised slightly
in 1973, lowered in 1974, and lowered in 1975. On
balance, reserve requirements were lowered for the
smallest deposit levels ($0 to $2 million) and for the
largest banks (over $400 million), with the intermediate-
sized deposit levels experiencing no change in
reserve requirements.
12 Haslag and Hein (1989) suggest that the Monetary
Control Act of 1980 (MCA) effectively lowered the
average reserve requirement for all depository institu-
tions. Our RSI measure supports the inference that
MCA effectively freed reserves for the system.
13 In other words, each series is differenced once and is
stationary—I(1). The Phillips–Perron test is applied to
RAM and to RSI in both level and percent-change
forms to examine the order of integration of each
series. RSI is designed as a series in which there are
infrequent, permanent shocks. Asymptotically, the
distribution theory behind the unit root tests applies to
series such as RSI. However, Nathan Balke and
Thomas Fomby (1991) argue that standard Dickey–
Fuller critical values result in too many rejections of the
unit root null hypothesis in finite samples.
Under the null hypothesis that there is a unit root in
RAM, the test statistics are 0.80 in level form and
–25.67 in percent-change form, whereas the test
statistics are 1.88 in level form and –46.38 in percent-
change form for RSI. The 5-percent critical value is
–3.17. The evidence suggests that RAM and RSI are
nonstationary in levels but stationary in percent change.
14 When RSI was regressed on RAM, the evidence
similarly failed to reject the null hypothesis that the
series were not cointegrated.
15 The issue is intertwined with differences between
outside and inside money. The deposits against which
reserves must be held are liabilities of banks and thus
reflect changes in the demand for and supply of
intermediated deposits. Changes in reserve require-
ment ratios, other things held constant, affect the
demand for high-powered money. Robert King and
Charles Plosser (1984) distinguish between real and
monetary effects, arguing that changes in outside
money (the monetary base) are nominal changes,
whereas movements in inside money (the money
multiplier) represent real changes in the financial
intermediation process. King and Plosser find that the
monetary base is correlated with prices but not with
real economic variables. However, the money multi-
plier is closely correlated with real economic variables.
Scott Freeman and Greg Huffman (1991) provide a
theoretical model that yields the same qualitative
correlations as King and Plosser find. In this case, both
changes in reserve requirements and changes in
deposits against which reserves must be held are real
changes. However, one is a policy variable, and the
other may only reflect behavioral changes due to
policy changes.
16 The changes in required reserves during the week in
which reserve requirements are changed will generally
not equal the difference between RAM measured
during the month in which reserve requirements
changed and the month before the change occurred.
17 The calculation of percentage change relative to
the quantity of monetary base is as follows: ∆SBt =
(SBt – SBt –1)/[(MBt + MBt –1)/2], where SB denotes
high-powered money and MB denotes the monetary
base. Thus, ∆MBt = ∆SBt + ∆RSIt + ∆DEPFLOWt.
Note that the variables are stationary in percent-
change form.
18 In a structural setting, Eugene Fama (1982) argues
that a bank’s decisions to supply deposits is likely to
be related to changes in reserve requirements. By
having both deposits and reserve requirements in
the regression, we are implicitly examining the effects
of changes in reserve requirements on economic
activity separately from the effects of changes in
deposits.
19 Table 1 attempts to provide some idea of the regres-
sion results without going into too much detail. Report-
ing the sum of the coefficient saves space compared
with reporting each individual coefficient. The full set of
parameter estimates and the data series are available
from the authors upon request.
20 The regressions are run with variables that are station-
ary. With stationary series, the thought experiment
seems a bit odd. The tests on the sum of the coeffi-
cients determine whether a once-and-for-all movement
in the policy would be related to a permanent change
in the measure of macroeconomic activity. Yet, the
policy variables have not exhibited movements that are14
consistent with the sort of permanence suggested by
the thought experiment. Indeed, both the policy meas-
ures and macroeconomic variables have reverted to
their constant mean value.
21 An important issue is the stability of the regression
coefficients over the sample period. We follow the
approach taken by Martin Feldstein and James Stock
(1993). We use a battery of six different tests for
parameter stability. Further, we treat the exact date(s)
at which the parameters changed as unknown. In each
of the three models estimated (inflation, output growth,
and nominal GNP growth), the test statistics fail to
reject the null hypothesis that the parameters are con-
stant over the sample. The test statistics are available
from the authors upon request.
22 We adopt 1951 as the starting point because the
Treasury–Fed accord establishes an identifiable
change in the Federal Reserve’s operating procedure.
Note that including data back to 1947, when quarterly
data for the postwar period become available, does
not change the major results presented in this article.
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Appendix
Monthly RSI Series, January 1929–December 1993
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
1929 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987
1930 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987
1931 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987
1932 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987
1933 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987
1934 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987
1935 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987
1936 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –3.987 –5.634 –5.634 –5.634 –5.634
1937 –5.634 –5.634 –5.634 –6.106 –6.106 –6.81 –6.81 –6.81 –6.81 –6.81 –6.81 –6.81
1938 –6.81 –6.81 –6.81 –6.81 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12
1939 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12
1940 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12
1941 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –6.12 –7.198 –7.198
1942 –7.198 –7.198 –7.198 –7.198 –7.198 –7.198 –7.198 –6.832 –7.198 –6.499 –6.107 –6.107
1943 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107
1944 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107
1945 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107
1946 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107
1947 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107 –6.107
1948 –6.107 –6.107 –6.667 –6.667 –6.667 –6.667 –7.101 –7.101 –7.101 –8.955 –8.955 –8.955
1949 –8.955 –8.955 –8.955 –8.955 –8.955 –7.748 –7.748 –6.932 –5.683 –5.41 –5.41 –5.41
1950 –5.41 –5.41 –5.41 –5.41 –5.41 –5.41 –5.41 –5.41 –5.41 –5.41 –5.41 –5.41
1951 –5.41 –7.066 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268
1952 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268
1953 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268 –7.268 –6.408 –6.408 –6.408 –6.408 –6.408
1954 –6.408 –6.408 –6.408 –6.408 –6.408 –6.408 –5.827 –5.154 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115
1955 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115
1956 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115
1957 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115 –5.115
1958 –5.115 –5.115 –4.338 –3.46 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926
1959 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926
1960 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926 –2.926 –2.762 –2.762 –3.189
1961 –2.828 –2.828 –2.828 –2.828 –2.828 –2.828 –2.828 –2.828 –2.828 –2.828 –2.828 –2.828
1962 –2.828 –2.828 –2.828 –2.828 –2.828 –2.828 –2.828 –2.828 –2.828 –2.828 –2.322 –1.872
1963 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872
1964 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872
1965 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872
1966 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.872 –1.991 –1.991 –2.787 –2.787 –2.787
1967 –2.787 –2.787 –2.787 –2.115 –2.115 –2.115 –2.115 –2.115 –2.115 –2.115 –2.115 –2.115
1968 –2.115 –2.714 –2.714 –2.714 –2.714 –2.714 –2.714 –2.714 –2.714 –2.714 –2.714 –2.714
1969 –2.115 –2.714 –2.714 –2.714 –3.657 –3.657 –3.657 –3.657 –3.657 –3.657 –3.657 –3.657
1970 –3.657 –3.657 –3.657 –3.657 –3.657 –3.657 –3.657 –3.657 –3.657 –3.331 –3.331 –3.331
1971 –3.331 –3.331 –3.331 –3.331 –3.331 –3.331 –3.331 –3.331 –3.331 –3.331 –3.331 –3.331
1972 –3.331 –3.331 –3.331 –3.331 –3.331 –3.331 –3.331 –3.331 –3.331 –3.331 –1.107 –1.107
1973 –1.107 –1.107 –1.107 –1.107 –1.107 –1.107 –1.107 –1.522 –1.522 –1.522 –1.522 –1.522
1974 –1.522 –1.522 –1.522 –1.522 –1.522 –1.522 –1.522 –1.522 –1.522 –1.522 –1.522 –1.522
1975 –1.296 –1.296 –.577 –.577 –.577 –.577 –.577 –.577 –.577 –.577 –.274 –.274
1976 –.274 –.193 –.193 –.193 –.193 –.193 –.193 –.193 –.193 –.193 –.193 –.193
1977 –.17 –.17 –.17 –.17 –.17 –.17 –.17 –.17 –.17 –.17 –.17 –.17
1978 0 0 0000000 .249 –3.184 –3.184
1979 –3.184 –2.241 –2.241 –2.241 –2.241 –2.241 –2.241 –2.241 –2.241 –3.963 –3.963 –3.963
1980 –3.963 –3.963 –3.963 –3.963 –3.963 –3.963 –.742 .445 .445 .445 –1.955 –1.955
1981 –1.955 –1.955 –1.955 –1.738 –2.578 –2.578 –2.578 –2.578 –1.527 –1.527 –1.527 –.326
1982 –.326 –.326 –.326 1.939 1.939 1.939 1.939 1.939 2.871 3.089 3.089 3.089
1983 3.498 3.498 3.498 4.328 4.328 4.85 4.85 4.85 6.289 6.681 6.681 6.681
1984 6.882 6.882 6.882 6.882 6.882 6.882 6.882 6.882 6.067 6.067 6.067 6.067
1985 7.655 7.655 7.655 7.655 7.655 7.655 7.655 7.655 6.36 6.36 6.36 6.36
1986 8.912 8.912 8.912 8.912 8.912 8.912 8.912 8.912 7.217 7.217 7.217 7.217
1987 10.864 10.864 10.864 10.864 10.864 10.864 10.864 10.864 8.584 8.584 8.584 8.584
1988 10.835 10.835 10.835 10.835 10.835 10.835 10.835 10.835 10.835 10.835 10.835 10.835
1989 13.305 13.305 13.305 13.305 13.305 13.305 13.305 13.305 13.305 13.305 13.305 13.305
1990 15.521 15.521 15.521 15.521 15.521 15.521 15.521 15.521 15.521 15.521 15.521 20.922
1991 25.624 25.624 25.624 25.624 25.624 25.624 25.624 25.624 25.624 25.624 25.624 25.813
1992 25.813 25.813 25.813 31.424 31.424 31.424 31.424 31.424 31.424 31.424 31.424 32.05
1993 32.05 32.05 32.05 32.05 32.05 32.05 32.05 32.05 32.05 32.05 32.05 32.193